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Argument
Defendants are statutorily immune from suit because the injury arose from
the construction, repair, or operation of a storm system

Water on the road is the key fact linking the accident to the storm
system. Because both the accident and the storm system directly relate to
draining water from the road, they are causally linked to each other. The
accident is linked to the water by the Barenbrugges' allegation that the
accumulation of water caused the accident. R. 2. In turn, the water is linked

to the storm system by undisputed evidence that the system "encompass[ed]
the entire accident site" and was "maintained by the State for draining water
from the surface of the road." Pet. Brf. at 6 (Stipulated Statement of
Undisputed Facts). Yet the Barenbrugges insist that the system installed to
drain water from the road has no causal relationship with their claim that the
State negligently failed to drain water from the road. This argument fails
because of the direct causal relationship the water has to both the accident
and the storm system. The Barenbrugges also misread the holding in Cook v.
City of Moroni, 2005 UT App 40, fl 8, 107 P.3d 713. There, this Court did not
create a causal distinction between water flowing from a storm system and
water unable to flow into a storm system. Because the accident and the storm
system here are causally linked to each other, immunity applies. See
Blackner v. Dep't of Transp.. 2002 UT 44, \ 15, 48 P.3d 949 (holding that the
"arises out of language in the immunity act "requires only that there be some
causal nexus between the risk and the resulting injury").
Without any supporting evidence below, it is mere speculation to
suggest what causal connection would exist if the accident happened at a
different location, farther from the nearest drainage box. The Barenbrugges
did not present evidence disputing the State's evidence that the drainage
system "encompass [ed] the entire accident site* and was "maintained by the
-2-

State for draining water from the surface of the road." Pet. Brf. at 6. Instead,
they challenged only the relevance of that evidence. They neither presented
conflicting causal evidence nor sought additional discovery under Rule 56(f).
The dispositive fact here is that the storm system, consisting of a series of
drainage boxes connected to a single underground pipe, was undisputedly
constructed and maintained to drain storm water from the entire section of
road where the accident occurred.
Furthermore, granting immunity in this case would not, as the
Barenbrugges suggest, allow the State to escape liability in all water-related
roadway accidents. The State has never argued that it is entitled to immunity
merely because a storm system could have been installed that would have
prevented the accident. Instead, it has always asserted that its immunity is
based on the presence of an actual storm system and that system's causal
connection to the accident. Only in cases such as this one, where a storm
system is causally related to the accident, will immunity apply.
The legislature's waiver of immunity for negligence and unsafe roads is
not absolute. That waiver is significantly limited by the broad flood and storm
systems exception: "Immunity is not waived under subsections (3) [waiving
immunity for unsafe roads] and (4) [waiving immunity for negligence] if the
injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from . . . the construction,
-3-

repair, or operation of flood or storm systems." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d301(5)(n) (West 2004) (emphasis added). This broad limitation on the waiver
of immunity applies to all flood and storm systems, not just to systems
unassociated with a road or those that are adequate to handle the deluge that
occurred here. The Barenbrugges' request for this Court to narrowly construe
the flood and storm system provision is unsupported by case law and by the
broad language of the immunity act. Although the Barenbrugges correctly
note that the discretionary function exception has been narrowly construed, it
does not follow that all of the exceptions in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)
should be so construed. The discretionary function exception has been
narrowly construed because nearly all acts of government involve at least
some amount of discretion. A broad construction would allow the exception to
swallow the rule. See Johnson v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 2006 UT 15, f 19,133
P.3d 402. But the flood and storm systems provision has never been narrowly
construed, nor do nearly all acts of government involve storm systems.
Moreover, as a general principle, the Utah Supreme Court has required that
the immunity act "be strictly applied" because it is through the immunity act
that the "legislature has recognized the necessity of immunity as essential to
the protection of the state in rendering the many and ever increasing number
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of government services/' Hall v. Dep't of Corrs., 2001 UT 34,1 14, 24 P.3d
958.
Without citing ambiguity in the statute, the Barenbrugges ask this
Court to further limit the plain language of the flood and storm systems
provision to unusual and catastrophic natural disasters only. But because
there is no ambiguity in the flood and storm systems provision, this Court is
precluded from examining any of the legislative history discussed by the
Barenbrugges. Wagner v. State. 2005 UT 54, f 10, 122 P.3d 599 (barring
ambiguity in a statute, Utah's appellate courts do not look beyond the plain
language of the statute). In any event, this Court has applied the identical
flood and storm systems language to a simple rainstorm that overwhelmed a
city's roadside drainage system. See Cook. 2005 UT App 40 at f 8. This
application is consistent with the current version of the immunity act, which
contains a separate provision retaining immunity for natural disasters,
suggesting that the flood and storm systems provision is not limited to only
catastrophic storms. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(5)(m) (retaining
immunity for "the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural
disasters").
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Conclusion
The State is immune from the Barenbrugges' claim because the
immunity act plainly and unambiguously retains immunity for this accident.
There is some causal connection between the accident and the storm system
because both are causally related to the road's water drainage. Accordingly,
the broad language of the flood and storm systems exception applies and the
State is entitled to immunity.
Dated this S^foy

of April, 2007.

. CLIFFORD PETERSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants/Petitioners
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